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GREED, GUNS AND GRIST: 
U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND ARMS TRANSFERS 
TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
ELIZABETH POWERS* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Commercial sales of conventional weapons,1 military services, and 
small arms and light weapons (SA/LW)2 net billions of dollars for U.S. 
businesses each year.3  Military assistance (i.e., government-to-government 
military aid) pours additional billions into the arms and military services 
industry.4  In 2008 military assistance ranked third on the U.S. foreign aid 
budget.5  Weapons sales and military assistance are the lifeblood of many 
corrupt leaders.  These leaders line their coffers with government money 
meant to be used for military assistance purposes, and use the acquired 
weaponry to engage in international antagonism and the repression of their 
citizens.6 
A glaring example of the negative effects of developing world arms 
spending sprees is the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DR Congo),7 
where military assistance and United States-supplied weapons enabled 
 
 *Elizabeth Powers is currently a law clerk for the Honorable Kristine DeMay.  She received a 
B.A. in political science and international relations from the University of Minnesota-Duluth in 
2004 and a J.D. from William Mitchell College of Law in 2007. 
1. RICHARD GRIMMETT, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS 
TO DEVELOPING NATIONS 1998-2005 89 (2006) [hereinafter GRIMMETT 1998-2005], available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL33696.pdf.  “Small arms” are defined as arms operated for 
personal use; “light weapons” are arms that can be operated by a small group of people.  The 
Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary General and Group of Governmental Experts on Small 
Arms, 24 n.5, delivered to the General Assembly, UN DOC. A/54/258 (Aug. 19, 1999). 
2. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS: U.S. EFFORTS TO 
CONTROL THE AVAILABILITY OF SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS 7 (2000), http:// 
www.gao.gov/archive/2000/ns00141.pdf. 
3. The Secretary-General, supra note 1, at 24 n.5. 
4. CURT TARNOFF & LARRY NOWELS, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, FOREIGN AID: AN 
INTRODUCTORY OVERVIEW OF U.S. PROGRAMS AND POLICY 7 (2004).  In 2004, the U.S. spent 
$4.791 billion in military aid.  Id. at 29. 
5. CONNIE VEILLETTE & SUSAN B. EPSTEIN, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, STATE, 
FOREIGN OPERATIONS, AND RELATED PROGRAMS: FY2008 APPROPRIATIONS 1 (2007).  Military 
aid outstripped humanitarian and multilateral aid.  Id. 
6. See Joe Oloka-Onyango, Beyond the Rhetoric: Reinvigorating the Struggle for Economic 
and Social Rights in Africa, 26 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 1, 43 (1995) (summarizing various civil 
liberties violations by African dictators). 
7. The DR Congo changed names many times throughout its tenure as an independent coun-
try.  While it may be historically incorrect to refer to the Democratic Republic of the Congo at all 
times, for the sake of simplicity, the abbreviation “DR Congo” is used throughout this article. 
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Mobutu Sese Seko (Mobutu) to retain power for over thirty years.8  
Mobutu’s downfall precipitated the Congo Conflict, which has lasted for 
over seven years and cost more than 3.8 million lives.9  The reverberations 
of the Congo Conflict are still felt throughout Central Africa.10  Over $9 
billion has been poured by the international community into the DR Congo 
to pick up the pieces left in the wake of the Congo Conflict.11 
Part I of this Article surveys the regulatory framework in which arms 
transfers and military assistance occur.12  Part II provides a historical back-
ground of the DR Congo, and summarizes and examines U.S. military aid 
and sales to the DR Congo since its independence from Belgium.13  Part III 
examines the consequences of military aid on the DR Congo and argues 
that the same analysis applies to other developing countries.14  Parts II and 
III illustrate the inconsistencies and ineffectiveness of the U.S. arms export 
control regime.15  Finally, Part IV recommends a framework for reform of 
the arms export control regime to reconcile it with U.S. foreign policy and 
national security interests.16 
 
8. Mobutu Sese Seko’s birth name was Joseph-Desire Mobutu.  He changed his name in a 
populist move to promote Africanization.  Mobutu Dies in Exile in Morocco: Ruled Zaire with 
Iron Grip for 3 Decades, CNN, Sept. 7, 1997, http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9709/07/ 
mobutu.wrap/. 
9. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, BACKGROUND NOTE: 
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO (2008) [hereinafter BACKGROUND NOTE], http:// 
www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2823.htm. 
10. JOHN PRENDERGAST & DAVID SMOCK, U.S. INST. OF PEACE, PUTTING HUMPTY 
DUMPTY TOGETHER: RECONSTRUCTING PEACE IN THE CONGO 2 (1999), available at http:// 
www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr990831.pdf. 
11. MONUC, Budget, http://www.monuc.org/News.aspx?newsID=11533&menuOpened= 
About%20MONUC.  The operational budget for MONUC from July 1, 2007 to June 30, 2008 was 
$1,115.65 million.  Democratic Republic of the Congo—MONUC—Facts and Figures, http:// 
www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/monuc/facts.html [hereinafter MONUC—Facts and Figures].  
MONUC has been operating in the DR Congo since 1999 with a comparable budget each year.  
Id.  See also  UN Mission in the Dem. Rep. of the Congo [MONUC], MONUC and the Elections: 
DR 2006 Elections, 1 (July 2006), http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/monuc/ 
elec.pdf [hereinafter MONUC and the Elections] (detailing the MONUC cost to date and the 
budgetary breakdown).  The United States funds 26.7% of all UN peacekeeping operations, and 
therefore has spent over $2.4 billion to fund MONUC.  Id. 
12. Infra Part I. 
13. Infra Part II. 
14. Infra Part III. 
15. Infra Parts II & III. 
16. Infra Part IV. 
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II. THE U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND ARMS TRANSFER 
SCHEMA 
The Congo Conflict is not a machete massacre.17  Millions of SA/LW 
units and conventional weaponry continue to wreak havoc within DR 
Congo’s borders.18  The United States provided several forms of military 
assistance to the DR Congo before the Congo Conflict.19  Military assis-
tance, given to DR Congo and other developing countries is governed by 
the Foreign Assistance  Act (FAA).20  Forms of military assistance include 
International Military Education and Training (IMET)21 and the provision 
of Excess Defense Articles (EDA).22 
Congress has codified parameters for the provision of IMET.23  The 
President may provide IMET to military and related civilian personnel of 
friendly foreign countries.24  IMET training and education is largely pro-
vided via foreign military members’ attendance at U.S. operated military 
facilities.25  Congress’ ostensible purpose in providing IMET is to encour-
age beneficial relations and understanding between the United States and 
foreign countries, to further international peace and security,26 to improve 
the ability of foreign countries to utilize their resources and become self-
reliant,27 and to increase recipient countries’ awareness of human rights.28  
In 2002, Congress imposed a requirement that the Secretary of State track 
IMET participants’ human rights records.29 
 
17. Although the major parties signed the Lusaka Accords in 2002, which were hailed as the 
end to the Congo Conflict, large scale battles continue to occur in Eastern DR Congo.  See, e.g., 
Press Release MONUC, Katanga: Armed Confrontations Between FARDC Troops in Kamina 
Brassage Centre (Feb. 19, 2008), http://www.monuc.org/News.aspx?newsId=16721 (informing 
that armed confrontations occurred in Southeastern DRC).  Ostensibly, the Goma Accords, signed 
in January 2008, were to bring a halt to continued conflict in Eastern DR Congo.  BACKGROUND 
NOTE, supra note 9.  Although the Goma Accord is arguably a means to “reestablish lasting peace 
and stability in the Great Lakes region,” recent fighting in Eastern DR Congo indicates that the 
Goma accords are of limited significance.  Id.  See also New Fighting Stops DR Congo Aid, BBC 
NEWS, Apr. 25, 2008, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7366477.stm (discussing 
renewed conflict in eastern DR Congo after the Goma Accord took effect). 
18. IRIN IN-DEPTH, GUNS OUT OF CONTROL: THE CONTINUING THREAT OF SMALL ARMS 
19 (2006), http://www.irinnews.org/pdf/in-depth/Small-Arms-IRIN-In-Depth.pdf. 
19. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 1998: DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO, 
HUMAN RIGHTS DEVS., http://www.hrw.org/worldreport/Africa-04.htm. 
20. 22 U.S.C.A. § 2151 (West 2008). 
21. Id. § 2347. 
22. Id. § 2321j. 
23. Id. § 2347. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. § 2347(1)-(3). 
26. Id. § 2347b(1). 
27. Id. § 2347b(2). 
28. Id. § 2347b(3). 
29. Id. § 2347h(a). 
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Congress has also placed restrictions on presidential discretion in the 
provision of EDA.30  The President may transfer EDA if such transfers are 
proposed to Congress in one of three ways.31  First, the President may justi-
fy the transfer in his or her annual congressional presentation documents for 
military assistance programs (Presidential Justifications).32  Second, he or 
she may show that the transfer falls under another permissible provision of 
the FAA.33  Third, if the President did not justify the transfer in his or her 
annual Justifications, he or she may separately authorize it within the same 
calendar year of the desired transfer.34 The President’s Justifications must 
explain the purposes of the transfer, its value, and whether the transfer was 
on a grant or sale basis.35 
The President is limited to EDA transfers which are drawn from exist-
ing Department of Defense stocks,36 and which do not require Department 
of Defense funds for shipping.37  The President’s Justifications must show 
that the transfer will not affect U.S. military preparedness,38 that the foreign 
policy benefits of a sale as opposed to a grant have been weighed,39 and that 
the sale will not adversely affect U.S. business interests.40  The President is 
required to notify Congress thirty days in advance of a transfer in excess of 
$7 million or of a designated defense article.41  Cumulative transfers may 
not exceed $425 million annually.42 
EDA transfers or an IMET allotment made on grant basis for over $3 
million requires the President to find that the recipient country complies 
with the United Nations Charter and that the recipient will only use the 
defense articles for self-defense.43 In addition to the Presidential Justifica-
tions, each year the Department of State submits Budget Justifications for 
 
30. Id. § 2321j. 
31. Id. § 2321j(a). 
32. Id. 
33. Id.  Specifically, the President may show that the transfer is pursuant to Part VIII of Sub-
chapter I of Chapter 32.  Id. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. § 2321j(h). 
36. Id. § 2321j(b)(1)(A). 
37. Id. § 2321j(b)(1)(B). 
38. Id. § 2321j(b)(1)(C). 
39. Id. § 2321j(b)(1)(D) 
40. Id. § 2321j(b)(1)(E). 
41. Id. § 2321j(f)(1). 
42. Id. § 2321j(g)(1). 
43. Id. § 2314(b)(1)-(2). 
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the next fiscal year to fund EDA and IMET programs on a country-by-
country, program-by-program basis.44 
Military assistance, however, is merely one piece in the large mosaic of 
arms transfers.  In the private sphere, U.S. weapons manufacturers consid-
erably outsell their competitors.  Private sales to the DR Congo during the 
Cold War and afterwards were commonplace.45  Private sales are governed 
by the Arms Export Control Act (AECA).46  By Executive Order No. 
11958,47 the President delegated authority to enforce private arms sales reg-
ulations under the AECA to the Secretary of State.48 The State Department 
issued the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) to implement 
this authority.49 
Pursuant to the AECA, the President must provide Congress with a 
classified report of all sales eligible for approval during the calendar year 
greater than $7 million.50  Similar to FAA requirements, the President must 
provide additional information to Congress if so requested.51  Under the 
AECA, the President is required to notify Congress of any offer to sell more 
than $25 million in defense goods or services to a foreign client.52  Con-
gress may block the proposed sale by a joint resolution disapproving the 
sale, which is subject to a presidential veto.53 
The AECA further provides that defense articles and services on the 
President’s United States Munitions List (Munitions List)54 are subject to 
registration and licensing requirements.55  The Munitions List has twenty-
one categories, which range from items solely for military use to items that 
 
44. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION FOR 
FOREIGN OPERATIONS (2007), http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/cbj/ [hereinafter 2007 BUDGET 
JUSTIFICATIONS] (providing a program-by-program, region-by-region, and country-by-country 
breakdown of the proposed foreign operation budget for 2007). 
45. See WILLIAM HARTUNG & BRIDGET MOIX, ARMS TRADE RES. CTR., DEADLY LEGACY: 
U.S. ARMS TO AFRICA AND THE CONGO WAR (2000), http://www.worldpolicy.org/projects/arms/ 
reports/congo.htm (providing an analysis of U.S. involvement in DR Congo). 
46. 22 U.S.C. § 2751 (West 2008). 
47. Exec. Ord. No. 11,958, 42 Fed. Reg. 4,311 (Jan. 18, 1977), reprinted as amended in 22 
U.S.C.A. § 2751 (2008), 1977 WL 201870. 
48. Id. 
49. Id.; see 22 C.F.R. pt. 129 (2007) (noting that the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls 
(DDTC) administers the ITAR). 
50. 22 U.S.C.A. § 2765(a)-(c). 
51. Id. § 2776(b)(1)(A)-(P). 
52. Id. 
53. See Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: 
Lessons of the Iran Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255, 1266 (1988) (detailing flaws in the foreign 
policy decision making process and chronicling the ascendancy of the executive branch in the 
area). 
54. 22 U.S.C.A. § 2778(a). 
55. Id. § 2778(b). 
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have civil application.56  The AECA targets private individuals engaged in 
the manufacture, export, import, or the brokering of items on the Munitions 
List.57  Individuals who willfully violate the AECA may be subject to 
criminal penalties.58  The AECA and ITAR do not apply extraterritorially.59 
Despite substantial regulation, criticism has been levied at the State 
Department’s export licensing procedures, which often involve lost applica-
tions, inconsistent licensing decisions, and processing delays.60  The U.S. 
system of dual jurisdiction between the State Department and the Com-
merce Department has likewise been ridiculed.61 
Although arms assistance and SA/LW sales and transfers are highly 
regulated, loopholes exist.  The Department of Defense engages in largely 
unmonitored Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET).62  The JCET pro-
grams are similar to IMET in that military personnel from other countries 
participate in military training.63  The JCET programs do not, however, 
have the same level of congressional oversight as IMET programs, nor do 
they require similar Presidential Justifications.64  JCET programs have re-
cently come under considerable scrutiny.65  In 1999, a General Accounting 
Office Report to Congress found that the Department of Defense had not 
accurately accounted for the number of JCET programs or their costs.66  To 
 
56. 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 (2007). 
57. 22 U.S.C.A. § 2778(b)(1)(A)(1). 
58. Id. § 2778(c). 
59. See, e.g., United States v. Yakou, 428 F.3d 241, 252-54 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (finding that it 
was Congress’ intent in promulgating the AECA that it would only apply to U.S. persons even 
though foreign brokers outside of the United States could be involved in activities affecting the 
United States). 
60. See generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EXPORT CONTROLS: REENGINEERING 
BUSINESS PROCESSES CAN IMPROVE EFFICIENCY OF STATE DEPARTMENT LICENSE REVIEWS 6-
11 (Dec. 31, 2001) (highlighting the overly burdensome nature of the State Department’s export 
licensing procedures). 
61. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REP. NO. GAO-02-120, EXPORT CONTROLS: 
CLARIFICATION OF JURISDICTION FOR MISSILE TECHNOLOGY ITEMS NEEDED 7-11 (Oct. 9, 2001). 
62. 10 U.S.C. § 2011 (2000). 
63. See, e.g., id. § 2011(a) (discussing the authority to pay training expenses with friendly 
foreign forces). 
64. Compare id. § 2011 (requiring the Secretary of Defense to submit a report to Congress 
specifying the recipient countries, training and benefits flowing from the provision of JCET 
funding for each fiscal year) with 22 U.S.C.A. § 2347 (West 2008).  Congress clearly indicated 
which type of programs it prefers the President to fund, placed limitations to which countries’ 
assistance may be provided, required the Secretary of Defense to submit human rights reports 
regarding recipient countries, and required Presidential Justifications.  Id. 
65. See generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MILITARY TRAINING: MANAGEMENT 
AND OVERSIGHT OF JOINT COMBINED EXCHANGE TRAINING 7, 32-40 (1999), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/ns99173.pdf (finding that the Department of Defense has not 
made accurate reports to Congress regarding JCET operations). 
66. International Military Training Transparency and Accountability Act, H.R. 1063, 106th 
Cong. (1999). 
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correct the problem the International Military Training Transparency and 
Accountability Act (Transparency and Accountability Act) was introduced 
the same year.67  The Transparency and Accountability Act would essen-
tially close the JCET loophole and prohibit all forms of military training 
and services to countries that are ineligible for IMET.68 The Transparency 
and Accountability Act was referred to the House International Relations 
Committee where it has languished for almost eight years.69 
Where Congress took action, for example, on sales to sub-Saharan 
African countries, oversight has been lax.70  Sales to countries who partici-
pated in the Congo Conflict may be viewed in light of 22 U.S.C. § 2773.71  
Section 2773 states Congress’ preference against selling military articles 
and defense services to Sub-Saharan Africa.72  Section 2773 does not bind 
the President; rather it puts him or her on notice that Congress may bind 
him or her at a later date if he or she does not act consistently with Con-
gress’ preferences.73  Despite Congress’ preference against arms transfers to 
Sub-Saharan Africa, U.S. manufactured arms continued to pour across 
borders throughout the Congo Conflict, as well as the civil wars in Liberia, 
Angola, and Sierra Leone.74  The abundance of U.S. manufactured and sup-
plied arms in conflict zones was largely the result of applicants indicating 
the arms were for end-user sales, which would pass muster under ITAR.75  
These applicants later sold the articles to countries or groups under embar-
gos.76  In 1996, Congress recognized the difficulties presented by end-user 
 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
69. See THOMAS Home, The Library of Congress, H.R. 1063, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d106:HR01063:@@@C (indicating the latest action for H.R. 1063). 
70. 22 U.S.C.A § 2773 (West 2008).  Section 2773 provides: 
It is the sense of the Congress that the problems of Sub-Saharan Africa are primarily 
those of economic development and that United States policy should assist in limiting 
the development of costly military conflict in that region. Therefore, the President 
shall exercise restraint in selling defense articles and defense services, and in 
providing financing for sales of defense articles and defense services, to countries in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Id. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. 
73. Kevin Sheehan, Executive-Legislative Relations and the U.S. Arms Export Control 
Regime in the Post-Cold War Era, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 179, 189-90 (1995). 
74. HARTUNG & MOIX, supra note 45.  See BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH, 
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, ARMS AND CONFLICT IN AFRICA (July 1, 2001), http://www.state.gov/s/ 
inr/rls/fs/2001/4004.htm (indicating that weapons continued to pour into Sub-Saharan Africa 
despite arms embargos). 
75. End Users Worry Arms Critics, THE WASHINGTON TIMES, Nov. 30, 2003, http:// 
washingtontimes.com/news/2003/nov/29/20031129-115544-1905r/. 
76. Id. 
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sales to parties under an embargo by amending Section 2785 of the 
AECA.77  The amendment requires the Department of Defense to monitor 
end-user sales with the objective of providing “reasonable assurances 
that . . . the recipient is complying with the requirements imposed . . . with 
respect to the use, transfers, and security of defense articles and defense 
services.”78  The end-use monitoring program has been deemed critical for 
maintaining physical accountability and security for weapons.79  The 
program, however, has had only limited success, as sales are still permitted 
to end-users in developing countries that abut conflict zones.80 
Other attempts for reform have similarly been unsuccessful.  In 1999, 
the McKinney-Rohrabacher Code of Conduct on Arms Transfers (Code of 
Conduct) was introduced.81  Essentially, the Code of Conduct requires 
presidential certification to Congress that the recipient country of U.S. 
military assistance and arms transfers is democratic, respects human rights, 
is not engaged in acts of armed aggression, and fully participates in the UN 
register of conventional arms.82  Like the Transparency and Accountability 
Act, the Code of Conduct died quietly and has awaited an Executive 
Comment since 1999.83 
An example of the present inconsistencies in U.S. policy regarding 
military assistance and arms transfers are the Cameroon provisions.  In 
2006, the United States provided $236,000 in foreign military assistance to 
Cameroon.84  In the 2007 Budget Justifications,85 the State Department 
acknowledged that Cameroon’s “democratic institutions are weak, corrup-
tion remains a real problem, and human rights abuses by Cameroon’s police 
and gendarmes forces are a concern.”86  According to the 2007 Budget 
Justifications, IMET funds were to be used “for professional military devel-
opment courses stressing resource management, [and] civilian-military 
relations.”87  The 2007 Budget Justifications also highlight Cameroon’s 
 
77. Defense and Security Assistance Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-164, § 40A, 110 
Stat 1421, 1436-37. 
78. Id. 
79. 2007 BUDGET JUSTIFICATIONS, supra note 44, at 227. 
80. DR Congo Arms Embargo ‘Failing,’ BBC NEWS, Oct. 16, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/ 
hi/africa/6055864.stm. 
81. Code of Conduct on Arms Transfers Act of 1999, H.R. 2269, 106th Cong. (1999). 
82. Id. § 3(a). 
83. See THOMAS Home, The Library of Congress, H.R. 2269, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d106:HR02269:@@@X (noting the actions for H.R. 2269). 
84. 2007 BUDGET JUSTIFICATIONS, supra note 44, at 263.  This amount is a decrease from 
the FY 2004, where $361,000 was spent on IMET to Cameroon.  Id. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. 
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eligibility to receive EDA on a grant basis pursuant Section 516 of the 
FAA.88  The 2007 Budget Justifications state that the material would be 
used by the government of Cameroon for internal security, counter-narcotic 
activities, peacekeeping deployments, and military modernization efforts.89 
The Human Rights Country Report for Cameroon, also published by 
the State Department, highlights several human rights violations.90  Viola-
tions by Cameroon’s security forces include “numerous unlawful killings 
by security forces[,] regular torture, beatings, and other abuses of per-
sons . . . by security forces[,] impunity among the security forces[,] severe 
limits on citizens’ ability to change their government[,] restrictions on free-
doms of speech, press, assembly, and association.”91  Yet the 2007 Budget 
Justifications noted that “Cameroon is a stable country in which the govern-
ment has been effective in managing ethnic and linguistic diversity.”92  A 
possible explanation for the inconsistencies between the Country Report 
and the Budget Justifications is a possible bureaucratic wall within the State 
Department.93 
The present loopholes and proscribed nature of the FAA and AECA 
and implementing procedures promulgated by the State Department reflect 
the need to correct problems arising from the provision of military assis-
tance and unregulated arms sales to developing countries.  Examining the 
disastrous effect that the combination of weapons sales, military assistance, 
cold war tensions, and corrupt politics had in DR Congo, evidences a 
compelling need for further revision of the FAA and AECA. 
III. CASE ON POINT:  THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO 
They were no colonists; their administration was merely a squeeze, 
and nothing more, I suspect.  They were conquerors, and for that 
you want only brute force—nothing to boast of, when you have it, 
since your strength is just an accident arising from the weaknesses 
 
88. Id. 
89. Id. 
90. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, 
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: CAMEROON (2006), http://www.state.gov/g/ 
drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61558.htm. 
91. Id. 
92. 2007 BUDGET JUSTIFICATIONS, supra note 44, at 263. 
93. This is a problem that human rights groups have tried to address.  Human Rights Watch 
highlighted the inconsistencies in the State Department’s Country Report on the Philippines and 
the 2001-2002 State Department estimate on military aid to be provided to the Philippines.  The 
Country Report listed numerous and serious human rights violations while the budget estimate 
listed 30,000 M16 rifles which were to be provided to the Philippine government.  HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH, SMALL ARMS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE NEED FOR GLOBAL ACTION (2003), 
http://hrw.org/background/arms/small-arms-070703-03.htm. 
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of others.  They grabbed what they could get for the sake of what 
was to be got.  It was just robbery with violence, aggravated 
murder on a great scale, and men going at it blind—as is very 
proper for those who tackle darkness.94 
The scramble for Africa began with King Leopold’s fabulous piece of 
cake: the Belgian Congo.  In the 125 years since its boundaries were artifi-
cially demarcated, DR Congo has experienced independence, two coups de 
état, several civil wars, assassinations, and the despoliation of its re-
sources.95  The scramble for DR Congo continues largely unabated.96  Since 
the assassination of Patrice Lumumba in 1960 the United States has played 
an integral role in the development of DR Congo.97  The United States 
provided military assistance to Mobutu throughout his tenure as one of 
Africa’s most infamous dictators.98  Foreign aid flowed freely into DR 
Congo despite brutal repression, failed and corrupt parastatals, and down-
right banditry amongst the upper echelons of government.99  It took the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union and the contemporaneous thawing of the 
Cold War for foreign aid to the DR Congo to significantly diminish.100  
Unable to hold the reins of government without large U.S. aid packages, 
Mobutu was overthrown in 1996.101  Mobutu’s ousting came at a high 
price:  over six years of conflict and more than five million deaths.102 
A. THE DR CONGO BEFORE MAJOR WESTERN INVOLVEMENT 
The U.S. subsidized influx of weapons was nothing novel to DR 
Congo.  Henry Morton Stanley, explorer extraordinaire to DR Congo, 
brought with him a powerful private army equipped with a thousand rapid 
 
94. JOSEPH CONRAD, THE HEART OF DARKNESS AND SELECTED SHORT FICTION 50 (Barnes 
& Noble Classics 2003) (1902). 
95. DR Congo had its first democratic election in July 2006.  Observers Praise DR Congo’s 
Poll, BBC NEWS, Oct. 31, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6101538.stm.  A run-off vote 
for president went relatively smoothly on October 30, 2006.  Id.  A U.S. observer stated that the 
poll was “light years ahead of anything” the DR Congo had previously seen.  Id. 
96. UN Troops ‘Armed DR Congo Rebels,’ BBC NEWS, Apr. 28, 2008, http://news. 
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7365283.stm. 
97. HARTUNG & MOIX, supra note 45. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. 
101. Jim Bitterman, Zaire’s Absent, Ailing Leader Says He’s Ready to Fight Back, CNN, 
Nov. 20, 1996, http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9611/20/zaire.mobutu/index.html. 
102. BENJAMIN COGHLAN ET AL., INT’L RESCUE COMM., MORTALITY IN THE DEMOCRATIC 
REPUBLIC OF CONGO: AN ONGOING CRISIS ii (2007), http://www.theirc.org/resources/2007/2006-
7_congomortalitysurvey.pdf. 
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fire rifles, a dozen small Krupp canons, and four machine guns.103  Morton 
Stanley’s armament was only a precursor to DR Congo’s colonial era, 
which was epitomized by the conscription of Congolese into the labor-
intensive rubber and ivory export industries.  The Belgian experience in DR 
Congo stands apart from other European countries’ experiences in Africa 
due to its brutality and complete control over the indigenous population.104 
From 1878 to 1960, DR Congo’s colonial period, all government entities 
were in strictly Belgian hands.105  The transition of DR Congo from a 
Belgian colony to an independent country was abrupt and chaotic.  In 
January 1960, Congolese political leaders and the Belgian government 
agreed upon a date for independence a mere six months later:  June 30, 
1960.106  Two political parties vied for power during the run-up to the 
official transition date:  the Association des Bakongo (ABAKO), an ethnic 
political party supporting the unification of the Bakongo people lead by 
Joseph Kasa-Vubu (Kasa-Vubu); and the Congolese National Movement 
(MNC), a nationalist party lead by Patrice Lumumba (Lumumba).107 
To effectively form a government, the two parties agreed to share 
power, with Kasa-Vubu as President and Lumumba as Prime Minister.108  
Kasa-Vubu was a moderate and was generally conciliatory towards 
Belgium.109  Lumumba’s feelings toward the former colonial power were 
made clear during a dinner celebrating DR Congo’s independence on June 
30, 1960.110  At the dinner, Belgium’s King Baudouin remarked that “[t]he 
independence of the Congo . . . constitutes the culmination of the work con-
ceived by the genius of King Leopold II.”111  In response, Lumumba fran-
tically scribbled notes in preparation for his speech.  He replied to King 
Baudouin: 
We have seen our lands despoiled under the terms of what was 
supposedly the law of the land but which only recognized the right 
of the strongest. . . .  We have seen the terrible suffering of those 
 
103. ADAM HOCHSCHILD, KING LEOPOLD’S GHOST: A STORY OF GREED, TERROR, AND 
HEROISM IN COLONIAL AFRICA 84 (Houghton Mifflin 1998). 
104. Id. at 158. 
105. MARTIN MEREDITH, THE FATE OF AFRICA: FROM THE HOPES OF FREEDOM TO THE 
HEART OF DESPAIR 93-94 (2005).  In 1878 King Leopold enlisted Henry Morton Stanley to carve 
out territory for him along the Congo River.  Id. at 94-95.  After King Leopold was forced to turn 
the territory over to the government of Belgium the military officers were strictly Belgian.  Id. at 
96. 
106. Id. at 100. 
107. Id. at 98. 
108. Id. at 102. 
109. Id. at 101. 
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banished to remote regions because of their political opinions or 
religious beliefs, exiled within their own country, their fate truly 
worse than death itself. . . .  And finally, who can forget the 
volleys of gunfire in which so many of our brothers perished, the 
cells where the authorities threw those who would not submit to a 
rule where justice meant oppression and exploitation.112 
Days after independence, the army, still under the heel of Belgian 
military commanders, rebelled against the nascent government.113  Belgium 
quickly offered to restore order.114  Lumumba flatly rejected Belgium’s 
offer but was unable to quell the rebellion.115  The crisis further escalated 
when Katangan leader Moise Tshombe (Tshombe), prompted by Belgian 
mining interests and the Belgian government, withdrew the Katanga 
province from DR Congo.116  Belgium, fearing for the viability of its former 
colony, unilaterally sent in its forces to restore order.117  Lumumba declared 
Belgium’s deployment an act of war.118 
Lumumba turned to the United Nations to bring the Katanga province 
back into DR Congo and restore order.119  When the United Nations did not 
satisfy Lumumba’s requests, he asked the Soviet Union for logistical assis-
tance.120  As a result of Lumumba’s request to the Soviet Union, DR Congo 
became embroiled in the Cold War.121 
Reacting to Lumumba’s bold moves, Belgium urged Kasa-Vubu to 
dismiss Lumumba.122  Kasa-Vubu was receptive to Belgian interests and 
dismissed Lumumba on September 5, 1960.123  In response, Lumumba 
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116. The Heart of Darkness, TIME, Dec. 22, 1961, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/ 
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Congo’s Mineral Wealth, BBC NEWS, Apr. 17, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/ 
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117. The Heart of Darkness, supra note 116. 
118. The Bear’s Teeth, TIME, Feb. 24, 1961, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/ 
0,9171,828769,00.html. 
119. TYRONE SAVAGE, The Democratic Republic of the Congo: Inchoate Transition, 
Interlocking Conflicts, in THROUGH FIRE WITH WATER 139 (Eric Doxtader & Charles Villa-
Vicencio eds., Africa World Press 2003). 
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dismissed Kasa-Vubu.124  The result was a constitutional impasse that 
paved the way for Mobutu.  On September 14, 1960 Mobutu announced 
that the army, with the help of the caretaker government, would henceforth 
rule the country.125  Subsequently, Mobutu worked out a deal with Kasa-
Vubu, wherein Mobutu would cede the country back to Kasa-Vubu in 
exchange for a larger role in government.126  The United Nations recog-
nized the deal as legitimate.127  Lumumba was consigned to be a prisoner in 
his own home, defrocked of his title of Prime Minister, and in fear for his 
life.128 
The Katangan succession, Belgian involvement, and the invitation by 
Lumumba to the Soviet Union, provoked the United States to enter the fray.  
The Congo Crisis was the first time the United States became significantly 
involved in African affairs.129  The U.S. involvement in the Congo Crisis 
included racist senators, air-force support for UN Blue Helmets, and 
citizens who formed the Committee for Aid to Katanga Freedom 
Fighters.130 
The combination of Cold War tensions, internal disagreement between 
ABAKO and the MNC, and foreign interests in DR Congo, all lead to 
Lumumba’s downfall.  Unfortunately, Lumumba did not heed the ominous 
signs.  On or about January 17, 1961, Lumumba was murdered with the 
complicity of Mobutu, the government of Belgium, and perhaps the United 
States.131  He was captured as he tried to escape from house arrest in the 
former governor’s mansion.132  He was flown to Katanga and executed by a 
firing squad.133  It took forty-one years for Belgium to acknowledge its 
complicity in his murder.134  The United States has yet to formally do so. 
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125. Id. 
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used to restore order). 
128. SAVAGE, supra note 119, at 141. 
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46 (2005). 
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B. HISTORY OF U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND ARMS SALES TO 
DR CONGO 
After Lumumba’s death, Kasa-Vubu had a tenuous hold on the reins of 
government.  The Katangan secessionists still presented a problem to effec-
tive governance.  In July 1964, Kasa-Vubu brought the Katangan secession-
ist leader, Tshombe out of retirement.135  Tshombe’s appointment as Prime 
Minister in a coalition government was Kasa-Vubu’s final attempt to stave 
off his government’s implosion.136  Lumumba’s supporters, known as 
Muleists, viewed this as an attack on their political ideology and revolted 
with the goal of seizing power in Kinshasa.137 
Western powers came to the aid of Kasa-Vubu, who they viewed as 
their pro-Western ally.  The United States provided logistical support for a 
ragtag group of government forces, foreign mercenaries, and Belgian para-
troopers.138  The support helped suppress the Muleists and pushed them 
back to a contained area in Eastern DR Congo.139  As a result, DR Congo 
was left with an unpopular, unelected government propped up not by the 
will of its people, but by the grace of foreign powers.140 
Tshmobe quickly became dissatisfied with his role as Prime Minister 
and sought to enlarge his power.141  Kasa-Vubu preferred to retain as much 
power for himself as possible, and accordingly, dismissed Tshombe.142  
This constitutional impasse had been played out before.  The result was the 
same:  On November 25, 1965, two years after the United States began 
providing aid to the Congolese military,143 Mobutu seized power.144  This 
time he took the reins with no intention of giving them up. 
 
135. Id. at 140. 
136. Id. at 143. 
137. Id. at 119; Lumumba Apology, supra note 131. The insurrectionists were called 
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138. Daniel Bergner, The Other Army, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2005, at 29.  Congo’s troops 
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141. Id. at 89. 
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143. See The Nat’l Archives, U.S. National Archives Report on FAA, http://aad.archives. 
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Mobutu’s rise to power was inextricably linked to U.S. support.  United 
States military assistance to DR Congo began in 1963, less than two years 
after Lumumba was assassinated and while the country was in a power 
dispute.145  All assistance went straight to DR Congo’s military.146  Since 
Mobutu was the commander-in-chief of the military forces, the United 
States provided aid to the branch of the Congolese government that had 
already seized power from those democratically elected. 
United States military assistance to DR Congo initially was in grant 
form.147  The policy of American administrations, however, soon shifted to 
a preference for arms sales.148  In 1973 the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee called on the State Department to “get . . . arms sales business 
back to free enterprise where they belong.”149  Thus, while military 
assistance grants to DR Congo (and other developing countries) stagnated 
between the late 1960s and 1970s, arms sales rose from approximately $100 
million in 1966 to $3.5 billion in 1978.150  However, the focus on weapons 
sales was short-lived.  By the 1980s, few recipient developing countries, 
including DR Congo, could afford to pay for the weaponry due to massive 
indebtedness.151  Within twenty years, arms transfers had come full circle 
back to military assistance grants.152 
Arms transfers to Sub-Saharan Africa during this period reflected 
worldwide trends.  In 1974 military assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa was at 
a low of $40 million.153  This figure dramatically increased during the 
Second Cold War, from 1982 to 1985.154  During the Second Cold War, 
more than $310 million in military aid were given to developing coun-
tries.155  Further, U.S. policy was to encourage Western suppliers to provide 
arms through sales on favorable terms.156  Thus, while the United States 
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provided a significant amount of assistance over a period of a mere three 
years, it was only one player amongst many transferring arms to DR 
Congo.157 
Throughout his tenure as Africa’s most notorious dictator, the United 
States provided Mobutu with more than $300 million in weapons and $100 
million in military training.158  It is also possible that the United States 
covertly transferred arms via clandestine Central Intelligence Agency 
operations in DR Congo.159  Throughout this period the DR Congo received 
the most U.S. foreign aid out of all Sub-Saharan African countries, such aid 
outliving several U.S. administrations.160  The United States viewed 
Mobutu as an ally in the Cold War and thus turned a blind eye to his 
pilfering of the economy and other character flaws.161 
For more than thirty years Mobutu ruled DR Congo.162  “Mobutu’s rule 
was based on bonds of personal loyalty between himself and his 
cohorts.”163  Throughout Mobutu’s reign, a once poor uneducated boy from 
the backwaters somehow netted $6 billion.164  Each time Mobutu’s power 
was seriously threatened, Western countries came to his aid.165  President 
George H. W. Bush at one time went so far as to extol Mobutu as “one of 
our most valued friends.”166  When justifying the transfer of EDA to DR 
Congo, he declared “that the furnishing, sale and/or lease of defense articles 
and services to the Government of Congo will strengthen the security of the 
United States and promote world peace.”167  Such support enabled Mobutu 
to oppress political opponents and thus hampered the development of 
democracy and the rule of law within DR Congo. 
 
157. Timeline: Democratic Republic of Congo, BBC NEWS, Apr. 30, 2008, http://news.bbc. 
co.uk/2/hi/africa/country_profiles/1072684.stm. 
158. The Nat’l Archives, supra note 143. 
159. Id. 
160. GEORGE B.N. AYITTEY, AFRICA UNCHAINED: THE BLUEPRINT FOR AFRICA’S FUTURE 
213 (2005). 
161. MCKINLAY & MUGHAN, supra note 147, at 59. 
162. See generally Timeline: Democratic Republic of Congo, supra note 157 (detailing 
significant events leading up to and major developments in the Congo Crisis). 
163. SAVAGE, supra note 119, at 141. 
164. Alan Cowell, Mobutu’s Zaire: Magic and Decay, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1992, at 31.  
Compare with $110, the amount an average Congolese earns per year.  See The World Bank 
Group, http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/ext/DDPQQ/report.do?method=showReport (providing sta-
tistics on DR Congo’s economic profile).  It would take 54,545,455 years for one of Mobutu’s 
former citizens to earn as much as he had amassed.  Mobutu was not ashamed of his pilfering: he 
proudly admitted on a CBS program in 1984 that he was the second richest man in the world. 
AYITTEY, supra note 160, at 213. 
165. Timeline: Democratic Republic of Congo, supra note 157.  For example, in 1977, 
France and Belgium aided him in thwarting an attack by rebels based out of Angola.  Id. 
166. HOCHSHILD, supra note 103, at 303. 
167. Presidential Determination No. 91-49, 56 Fed. Reg. 46,977 (Aug. 24, 1991). 
       
2008] GREED, GUNS & GRIST 399 
C. TIMES CHANGE 
Due to its mineral wealth, size, and location, DR Congo was able to use 
Cold War tensions to secure aid from the West.168  At the end of the Cold 
War, as the amount of U.S. military assistance decreased, Mobutu’s grip on 
power in the DR Congo ebbed.169  After the end of the Cold War, the 
United States grew tired of propping up a dictator and kleptocrat.170  The 
United States presented Mobutu with an ultimatum: either allow for multi-
party politics, or be prepared to face an existence devoid of U.S. aid.171  
Feeling the tightening of the purse strings, Mobutu allowed other parties to 
form and appointed a transition government in 1990.172  Within days of 
allowing political pluralism, over 400 political parties sprang up.173 
Mobutu quickly saw that he had little political support.  He retracted 
his authorization of political pluralism, declared political parties illegal and 
prohibited them from assembling.174  Shortly thereafter, approximately 
seventy-five students were killed protesting Mobutu’s latest about-face.175  
Mobutu remained imperturbable and refused to open an internal inquiry 
into the matter.176  As a result, countries that were once Mobutu’s biggest 
donors turned to publicly criticize him.177 
During the impasse Mobutu forgot to pay the soldiers, and in 1991 they 
rebelled in Kinshasa.178  The rebellion forced Mobutu to agree to a coalition 
government with opposition leaders, the Sovereign National Conference 
(SNC), which was intended to serve as a transitional government.179  The 
SNC gave itself a legislative mandate and elected Etienne Tshisekedi as 
Prime Minister.180  Sharing power, however, was not an acceptable outcome 
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for Mobutu.  In response Mobutu created his own government.181  The year-
long stalemate between the SNC/Tshisekedi and Mobutu ended with an 
agreement to merge the two factions and hold an election within two 
years.182  The election did not occur.  Mobutu subverted a transition to 
democracy by using his control over the armed forces to obstruct SNC 
government functions, intimidate opposition leaders, promote anarchy and 
chaos, and incite violence. 183 
The death knell for Mobutu did not come from internal troubles; 
instead it was the result of the instability of a neighbor, Rwanda.  In 1994 
the majority Hutu population systematically exterminated the minority 
Tutsi population.184  At the end of the genocide over 800,000 Tutsis and 
their Hutu sympathizers lay dead throughout Rwanda.185  Hutu militias, 
known as the Interahamwe,186 had fled to massive refugee camps in Eastern 
DR Congo after the Tutsis took control of the Rwandan government.187  
The Interahamwe used Eastern DR Congo as a base for attacks against their 
perceived enemies in Rwanda.188  The newly installed Tutsi government in 
Rwanda, headed by President Paul Kagame, soon tired of constantly 
combating the Interahamwe.189  President Kagame, upset that Mobutu 
would not oust the rebels from Eastern DR Congo, joined forces with 
Uganda’s President, Yoweri Museveni.190  President Museveni saw the 
strategic benefit of having a self-installed ally in the DR Congo.191  On 
October 8, 1996, Congolese rebel, Rwandan, and Ugandan forces 
attacked.192  They were headed by a Congolese face, Laurent Kabila, and 
shared a common goal:  the ouster of Mobutu.193 
 
181. Id. at 392. 
182. Time Line of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, supra note 157. 
183. SAVAGE, supra note 119, at 142. 
184. See PHILIP GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT TOMORROW WE WILL BE 
KILLED WITH OUR FAMILIES 6 (1998) (“[E]veryone in the country’s Hutu majority group was 
called upon to murder everyone in the Tutsi minority.”). 
185. Id. 
186. Translated from Kinrwanda, in an interview with Rwandan refugees in Kenya, 
Interahamwe means those who attack together. 
187. GOUREVITCH, supra note 184, at 269-72.  Ironically, the international community spent 
more on aid for the Hutu genocidiers than on their Tutsi victims.  Id. 
188. Id. 
189. MEREDITH, supra note 105, at 530-31. 
190. Id. at 531. 
191. Id. 
192. Id. 
193. Id. at 531-32. 
       
2008] GREED, GUNS & GRIST 401 
D. THE FALL OF MOBUTU AND THE MILITARIZATION OF DR CONGO 
Mobutu, weakened by a drop in U.S. funding, could not suppress the 
invading forces and fled after a year of warfare and failed peace talks.194  
Kabila swiftly moved into Kinshasa and consolidated power.195  The United 
States quickly thereafter offered military support to the new government.196 
The change in government did not lend stability to DR Congo.  Laurent 
Kabila soon tired of his Rwandan and Ugandan benefactors and attempted 
to sever relations.197  Rwanda and Uganda reacted by reinvading DR 
Congo.198  Kabila, unable to rebuff their forces alone, called upon a 
different set of neighbors for assistance: Angola, Zimbabwe, and 
Namibia.199  By 2000, Rwanda and Uganda occupied the Eastern half of the 
country while Angola, Zimbabwe, and Namibia ruled the Western half.200  
The result was one of the deadliest wars in African history.201 
The states that de facto partitioned DR Congo were also beneficiaries 
of arms transfers.202  From 1989 to 1998, commercial arms sales to Angola 
were $31,000; Namibia $4,245,000; Rwanda $324,000; Uganda 
$11,420,000; Zimbabwe $1,395,000.203  Furthermore, all of the foreign 
troops had received training via IMET funds.204  Angola’s IMET value 
during this period was $177,000; Namibia $1,589,000; Rwanda $1,425,000; 
Uganda $3,856,000; and Zimbabwe $2,661,000.205  Although foreign 
involvement in the Congo Conflict was extensive, indigenous factions 
(rebels) formed within DR Congo.206  As a result, a highly nuanced 
hybridization of civil war, proxy war, and international war was waged. 
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In July 1999 the parties, including the indigenous factions, signed the 
Lusaka Accords.207  The Lusaka Accords called for the withdrawal of all 
foreign elements from DR Congo, the disarmament of rebel groups not 
party to the agreement (over fifty rebel leaders were party to the agree-
ment), and the deployment of a peacekeeping force.208  The parties, how-
ever, fell far short of their promises and the fragile framework for peace 
quickly fractured.209  The failure of the Lusaka Accords led to a rapid 
growth in ethnic militarism throughout DR Congo.210  Eventually, the 
various rebel-held zones were transformed into the rebel groups’ 
fiefdoms.211  Eastern DR Congo became the most factionalized area.212  
Rebel groups of note in the area included the Front des Nationalists et 
Integrationnistes (FNI) lead by Peter Karim, the Front de Resistance 
Patriotique in Ituri (FRPI) lead by “Cobra” Matata, and the Mouvement 
Revolutionnaire Congolais (MRC) lead by Matthieu Cui Ngudjolo.213 
As the situation in DR Congo deteriorated the occupying countries saw 
the potential to exploit its resources.  Initially, Rwanda and Uganda squared 
off with Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe, but it was not long before even 
the allies turned against each other in a fight for primacy over the spoils of 
their conquest.214  During this period Rwanda, which does not produce 
cobalt (used in the manufacture of cell phones), boasted $250 million in 
cobalt exports.215  Similarly, Uganda, a country with virtually no mineral 
wealth, began exporting diamonds while its troops occupied Eastern DR 
Congo.216  The DR Congo brought Uganda’s actions to the attention of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1999, claiming that “by . . . providing 
unlimited aid to rebels in the form of arms and armed troops, in return for 
the right to exploit the wealth of the Congo for their own benefit, Uganda 
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has defied the international community and created a dangerous 
precedent.”217  The ICJ agreed and found: 
That the Republic of Uganda, by acts of looting, plundering and 
exploitation of Congolese natural resources committed by 
members of the Ugandan armed forces in the territory of the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo and by its failure to comply 
with its obligations as an occupying Power in Ituri district to 
prevent acts of looting, plundering and exploitation of Congolese 
natural resources, violated obligations owed to the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo under international law[.]218 
For almost a decade Eastern DR Congo was stripped of its gold, 
diamonds, and timber in the race for political primacy in the region.219  The 
feast on DR Congo’s mineral riches by these groups continues unabated, 
although now the plunder is primarily perpetrated by rebel groups.220 
Although the plunder of DR Congo’s resources is appalling, the most 
grisly cost of the Congo Conflict is the loss in human life.  The 
International Rescue Committee (IRC) reported that from 1998 to 1999, 1.7 
million lives were lost as a result of the conflict, 200,000 of which are 
directly attributable to acts of violence.221  The deaths not attributable to 
direct acts of violence were a result of opportunistic diseases, preying on 
the collapse of health services and scarcity of food supplies.222  As a result 
of the conflict, DR Congo is an unchecked incubation zone for disease.223  
By 2007, the IRC estimated that 5.4 million people died as a result of the 
Congo Conflict.224  Forty-seven percent were children.225 
Laurent Kabila’s tenure as leader of DR Congo was short lived:  he 
was assassinated on January 16, 2001.226  There was little time for a power 
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vacuum to develop as Laurent Kabila’s son, Joseph, quickly took his 
father’s place.227  Joseph reversed many negative aspects of his father’s 
rule.  Under Joseph’s oversight, DR Congo achieved relative stability in the 
later months of 2003228 due to the withdrawal of foreign troops in 
December 2002,229 and an agreement with the opposition parties for a tran-
sitional government and elections.230  Joseph also oversaw the passage of a 
new constitution by the Congolese electorate in December 2005.231  The 
new constitution passed with eighty-four percent of voters’ support.232  The 
new government also honored its promises and in July 2006 Congolese 
flocked to the polls for DR Congo’s first democratic election.233  In 
November 2006, Joseph Kabila was declared the victor.234  Despite the first 
free and fair election in the history of DR Congo, it is unclear if peace is in 
its near future.235  Arms continue to flow into Eastern DR Congo from 
Eastern Europe via Rwanda and Uganda despite an arms embargo, fueling 
rebel groups and preventing effective control from the Kinshasa-based 
government.236 
E. U.S. INTERESTS IN DR CONGO AND CONTINUED ARMS 
TRANSFERS 
Despite arms embargos imposed on DR Congo by the UN Security 
Council in 2003, 2005, and 2006, arms are smuggled, circulated illicitly 
internally, and embargoed material is stockpiled.237  Individual soldiers of 
DR Congo’s armed forces routinely sell arms and ammunition to 
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supplement their income.238  Further, there have been reports of UN peace-
keepers selling arms for gold in Eastern DR Congo.239  Enabled by non-
existent or corrupt customs authorities, Anatov planes continue to operate 
with impunity in violations of the embargos.240 
Notwithstanding over a decade of neglect, the United States pur-
portedly views DR Congo as the key to stability in Central Africa.241  The 
policy of the United States is to support the transitional government and 
encourage peace, prosperity, democracy, and the respect for human 
rights.242  The United States currently provides aid to DR Congo through 
the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development 
(USAID).243  The State Department has requested $1.1 million in military 
aid for DR Congo for 2008.244  Most of the requested aid for DR Congo, 
however, is for institution building and health initiatives.245 
The deleterious effects of previous U.S. military assistance and arms 
sales to DR Congo and other corrupt and brutal governments are ubiquitous 
throughout the developing world.  Yet the United States continues to allow 
arms sales and provides military assistance to questionable governments, 
often with egregious human rights violations on their rap-sheets.246  Such 
arms and military assistance are vital to the stability of the recipient govern-
ment, affording it the ability to protect itself from internal and external 
enemies and entrench itself in power.247 
A substantive change in U.S. military assistance policy seems unlikely.  
Congress recently enacted the American Service-Members Protection 
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Act,248 which would cut military aid for any country that became party to 
the Rome Statute, which is the charter document for the International 
Criminal Court.249  With very limited exceptions under the Act, military aid 
is only available for countries party to the Rome Statute which enter into 
agreements with the United States pursuant to Article 98 (i.e., “Article 98 
Agreements”).250  Article 98 Agreements prevent the International Criminal 
Court from proceeding against U.S. personnel within the country’s 
borders.251  An indicator of the significance of military aid to developing 
countries is reflected by the large number of Article 98 Agreements entered 
into with developing countries.252 
Similarly, private market weapon sales to developing countries 
continue to thrive.  Although less than ten percent of U.S. weapons transfer 
agreements with developing countries are made with African countries, 
such transfer agreements are crucial to those countries.253  In terms of 
absolute numbers, other countries’ weapons sales pale in comparison to 
U.S. sales.  For example, Germany had the largest total number of arms 
agreements with African countries (15.8%), which totaled $1.5 billion,254 
one-ninth of the value of U.S. arms sales agreements to African countries 
($13.6 billion).255 
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IV. ERRORS EVIDENT FROM THE PROVISION OF MILITARY 
ASSISTANCE TO DR CONGO 
A. LEADERS OF RECIPIENT DEVELOPING COUNTRIES MAY USE 
CHILD SOLDIERS OR COMMIT OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES 
Laurent Kabila was known not only for his brief tenure as head of 
government for DR Congo, but also for his use of child soldiers.256  The 
FNI, FRPI, and MRC, a few of the numerous rebel groups in DR Congo, 
consistently recruit and use children within their ranks.257  A number of the 
leaders of the various rebel groups, which knowingly recruited and retained 
child soldiers, are now incorporated into DR Congo’s armed forces 
(FARDC).258  There are still an estimated 30,000 child soldiers serving in 
militias throughout DR Congo.259  A UN Group of Experts on DR Congo 
found the violation of international laws concerning children in armed 
conflict to be endemic.260 
Use of child soldiers in militias and rebel groups within unstable de-
veloping countries is hardly an anomaly.  Where AK47s, M16s, grenades, 
handguns, and pistols are readily available, the only concern is finding 
someone to use them.  During the Liberian civil war, the Liberian govern-
ment was estimated to have recruited 21,000 child soldiers.261  The Lord’s 
Resistance Army (LRA) based in Northern Uganda has also been cited for 
using child soldiers, who are abducted from their villages and foisted into a 
life of crime.262 
There are an estimated 300,000 child soldiers worldwide.263  Use of 
child soldiers directly contravenes the Convention on the Rights of the 
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Child.264  In light of the basic human rights tenets concerning the prohibi-
tion of the use of child soldiers, which the United States promulgated and 
continues to support,265 aiding regimes that use child soldiers violates U.S. 
principles. 
Human rights violations in African countries are almost too numerous 
for review.  The United States provided military assistance and U.S. com-
panies sold arms to the vast majority of these countries.266  Many Sub-
Saharan African countries violate their citizens’ fundamental political 
rights.  For example, Zimbabwe’s 2002 presidential election was set against 
widespread, politically motivated violence instigated by Mugabe’s 
Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front.267  Predictably, Mugabe 
was reelected.268  Mugabe went on to oust white farmers, demolish informal 
housing developments, and restrict the availability of goods.269  Such 
actions lead to shortages in basic needs amongst the population and served 
as the impetus for refugee crises.270 
Military assistance and arms transfers to human rights violators are not 
just confined to Africa.  Central American end users of arms transfers are 
notorious for their poor human rights records.271  Southeast Asian countries 
known for human rights violations have also had influxes of M16 rifles.272  
Lebanon, home to Hezbollah and other Islamic fundamentalists, received 
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38,000 U.S. supplied M16s from 1980 to 1983 alone.273  U.S. arms transfers 
also reached the Balkans.274 
The FAA is not silent as to arms transfers to human rights abusers.  In 
the U.S. arms transfer schema, Section 2304 of the FAA provides that 
military assistance may not be provided to any government “which engages 
in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized hu-
man rights.”275  However, to determine whether a government consistently 
violates human rights, Congress requires the President to consider whether 
the government engaged in or tolerated severe violations of religious 
freedom.276  Other internationally recognized human rights, such as free-
dom from torture, genocide, and slavery did not warrant this special con-
sideration.277  Congress reserved the right to request information regarding 
countries’ human rights practices and the reason why military assistance is 
continuing to be provided,278 which the State Department has thirty days to 
produce.279  Section 2304 is rarely invoked to prohibit military assistance or 
arms sales to human rights abusers.280 
B. U.S. ASSISTANCE TO UNSTABLE COUNTRIES UNDERMINES THEIR 
NEIGHBORS’ STABILITY 
There are numerous militias and rebel groups in DR Congo.  The use of 
Eastern DR Congo as a rebel base threatens the security interests of neigh-
boring countries.  For example, Interahamwe attacks on Rwandan civilians 
and troops, which are launched out of Eastern DR Congo have provoked the 
government of Rwanda to respond by sending troops into DR Congo.281  
Further, the Congolese Liberation Movement (MLC) regularly received 
military support from Uganda.282  Uganda has also been a longtime 
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recipient of U.S. military aid.283  During the Congo Conflict, the MLC 
controlled Northeastern DR Congo.284 
Similar dynamics to those between Rwanda, Uganda, and DR Congo 
are endemic to the developing world.  In 2000, the United Nations was 
bombarded with claims that West African nations were systematically sub-
verting arms sanctions by smuggling arms across borders in exchange for 
diamonds, timber, and other natural resources.285  The arms smuggling 
enabled the embattled Charles Taylor to stay in power in Liberia for a 
protracted period and to smuggle arms into Sierra Leone for a supporting 
faction.286  This highly militarized situation resulted in civil wars in both 
countries.  The United States has also provided a substantial amount of 
weaponry to Ethiopia.  From 2005 to 2006, U.S. arms transfers to Ethiopia 
were valued in excess of $19 million.287  For 2007, the stated value of arms 
transfers was $10 million.288  Ethiopia is now well-equipped for interven-
tion in Somalia and Eritrea.  Ethiopia has fought several wars with Eritrea 
in the past and border disputes continue.289  Ethiopia’s relations with 
Somalia are likewise acrimonious.  In January 2007, Ethiopia invaded 
Somalia with the ostensible purpose of restoring the rightful government, 
the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), which is pro-Ethiopia.290  
Despite the installation of the TFG, Ethiopian troops continue to occupy 
Somalia.291 
C. UNSTABLE COUNTRIES ARE LIKELY TO IMPLODE, THEREBY 
GIVING SAFE HAVEN TO TERRORISTS 
The United States has recognized the inherent danger of failed states.292  
Examples of failed states that have provided safe harbor to terrorists include 
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Afghanistan and Somalia.293  Somalia is a largely militarized country that 
was taken over by warlords in 1990.294  This fractionalized state now 
houses al-Qaeda operatives.295  Incidents are on the rise of al-Qaeda and 
other terrorist groups obtaining arms through illicit deals, posing a direct 
threat to U.S. forces abroad.296  Although Somalia is under an arms 
embargo,297 arms continue to pour in.298  From 2005 to 2006 the Central 
Intelligence Agency funneled hundreds of thousands of dollars to Somali 
warlords.299  The warlords then used the money to buy weapons and con-
tinue to wreak havoc throughout the country.300 
D. MORE PROSPEROUS COUNTRIES FOOT THE CLEAN-UP BILL 
ANYWAY 
In the aftermath of the Congo Conflict, the United Nations deployed a 
peacekeeping force and an observer mission, the United Nations Mission to 
the DR Congo (MONUC).301  MONUC is charged with collecting weapons 
from civilians, scheduling and supervising the withdrawal of foreign forces, 
providing protection to displaced persons, and supervising the transition to 
democracy.302  For calendar year 2007 to 2008, MONUC had a budget of 
over $1.1 billion.303  The same countries that previously provided military 
assistance or allowed arms sales or transfers from domestic companies to 
DR Congo now finance MONUC (e.g., the United States, France, and 
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Belgium).304  Furthermore, President Bush pledged $28 million to assist 
refugees from DR Congo.305 
Not only are undemocratic militarized African governments dangerous 
to their populations and neighbors, they also present a high bill to the world 
community in terms of peacekeeping efforts and humanitarian assistance 
once they implode.  Publicly funded international institutions (the United 
Nations), individual countries (the United States), and private entities (e.g., 
the Red Cross and Save the Children), pour billions of dollars into what 
appears to be an abyss.306  In light of budgetary considerations, it may prove 
more efficient to simply stop providing military assistance and allow U.S. 
arms dealers to sell to African countries with questionable human rights 
records and a tenuous hold on democracy.307 
V. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The United States dominates the arms transfer industry.308  The United 
States asserts that it has the most comprehensive arms transfer regulations 
in the world.309  With minor alterations, the U.S. system will set the exam-
ple for other countries as to what comprises a sound regulatory regime.  
Additionally, as the United Nations attempts to formulate an international 
arms transfer regime, the United States should not forfeit its leadership 
position. 
As a threshold matter, the U.S. State Department should consider 
creating a Bureau of Arms and Military Assistance Transfers (BAMAT).  
Under the new framework any proposed FAA transfer would flow solely 
through BAMAT before seeking congressional approval.  BAMAT would 
examine reports regarding human rights violations and democratic 
indicators as they apply to a proposal for military assistance or an arms sale, 
 
304. MONUC Facts and Figures, supra note 11. 
305. Id. 
306. As of July 2006, ninety-two peacekeepers had lost their lives while serving MONUC. 
MONUC and the Elections, supra note 11, at 1. 
307. International expert on humanitarian issues Francis Deng has noted that developed 
states appear to be more comfortable footing the clean-up bill than aggressively pursuing political 
solutions.  Sarah E. Hager, Zimbabwe: Why the United Nations, State, and Non-State Actors 
Failed to Effectively Regulate Mugabe’s Policy of Internal Displacement, 37 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 
221, 233 (2007) (quoting Bemma Donkoh, A Half-Century of International Refugee Protection: 
Who’s Responsible, What’s Ahead?, 18 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 260, 265 (2000)). 
308. Arms Trade Key Statistics, BBC NEWS, Sept. 15, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ 
business/4238644.stm.  In the United States alone, arms deliveries by private persons were valued 
at $18.5 billion in 2004.  Id.  The leading competitor, Russia, accounted for a mere $4.6 billion.  
Id. 
309. U.S. DEP’T. OF STATE, BUREAU OF POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS, BACKGROUND 
PAPER: THE U.S. APPROACH TO COMBATING THE SPREAD OF SMALL ARMS (2001), 
http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/fs/2001/3766.htm. 
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which would ideally remedy inconsistencies between State Department 
Human Rights Reports and Budget Justifications.310  Moreover, BAMAT 
would be the point of contact between the Commerce Department and the 
State Department.  Better coordination may lead to, at minimum, a more 
consistent policy toward recipient countries.  Preferably better coordination 
would lead to improved control over which countries receive military aid 
and assistance and ensure that those on the receiving end will use such 
resources appropriately.  The following statutory and treaty recommenda-
tions would operate most effectively under BAMAT. 
A. AMEND THE FOREIGN MILITARY ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961 
The Foreign Military Assistance Act of 1961 should be amended to 
require that the President find, in his or her Presidential Justifications, that 
the recipient countries are democratic.311  Democratic countries are less 
likely to go to war, largely due to the need for leaders to convince their 
constituencies that war is in their best interests.312  Democratic countries 
also are unlikely to routinely commit grave human rights violations.313  For 
these reasons and others, promoting the democratization of developing 
countries has been a consistent U.S. policy goal.314  Congress may guide 
 
310. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, 
HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/hr/ (last visited May 30, 2008) [hereinafter HUMAN 
RIGHTS].  The Under-Secretary for Democracy and Global Affairs is responsible for country 
reports on human rights practice, while the Deputy Secretary of State for Resource Management is 
responsible for the Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations.  Id. 
311. Pillars of democracy include: sovereignty of the people, government based upon the 
consent of the governed, majority rule, minority rights, guarantee of basic human rights, free and 
fair elections, equality before the law, and due process of law.  U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, DEFINING 
DEMOCRACY, http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/whatsdem/whatdmz.htm (last visited Aug. 2, 
2008). 
312. Secretary-General Kofi A. Annan, Cyril Foster Lecture at Oxford University: Why 
Democracy Is an International Issue (June 19, 2001). 
313. Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, The 2002-2003 Peltason Lecture at the University of California, 
Irvine: Democracy and Human Rights—The Essential Connection (July 1, 2003). 
314. HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 310. 
Because the promotion of human rights is an important national interest, the United 
States seeks to . . . [p]romote greater respect for human rights, including freedom from 
torture, freedom of expression, press freedom, women’s rights, children’s rights and 
the protection of minorities, [p]romote the rule of law, seek accountability and change 
cultures of impunity. 
Id. 
[D]emocracy is more than a single election, or even a succession of them. It is a way 
of life for a nation embracing its life and institutions, and all their complexity and 
embraced in turn by its people and their actions, thoughts and beliefs. . . .  [We] should 
not readily believe that without an enduring American presence, democracy can be so 
easily implanted and nourished in societies where history and experience suggest it is 
quite alien. 
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this determination by setting statutory factors for the President to consider.  
For a country to qualify as democratic it should have at least five years of 
experience with democratic government or at least one election cycle, 
whichever is the later.  Although five years is not a substantial period of 
time, it generally is enough time for democratic institution building to 
begin.  The present FAA requirement that recipient countries do not violate 
or condone serious human rights abuses should be extended to a look-back 
period of five years.  By amending the FAA, the State Department could no 
longer request military aid funding for human rights violators or countries 
with poor democratic track records.  If such changes are implemented, 
neighbors of countries engaged in open conflicts in developing countries 
will most likely not qualify for military assistance.315 
B. AMEND THE ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT316 
The AECA should be amended to mirror the proposed changes to the 
FAA.  The same process for determining the democratic status of a country 
should be used in the FAA and AECA.  Likewise, there should be the same 
look-back period of five years to determine if a country has had serious 
human rights violations. 
Under the AECA, when deciding whether to issue an export license for 
sale to a foreign government, the State Department should additionally 
examine the country of residence of a private buyer.  When examining the 
recipient country or to where the articles on the Munitions List are destined, 
the State Department should prohibit export to countries that are not 
considered democratic and/or have had serious human rights violations in 
the past five years.  When examining the export of articles on the Munitions 
List, the State Department should consider the additional factors of whether 
the articles would be used in committing human rights abuses and whether 
they would prejudice the development of bilateral or multilateral arms 
control, including light weapons control, nonproliferation, or other 
arrangements. 
 
Hearing Before the Comm. on Int’l Relations, supra note 292, at 7-11 (statement of Henry Hyde, 
Chairman of the Comm. on Int’l Relations), http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/ 
hfa26078.000/hfa26078_0 htm.  See also President George W. Bush, Address at Inaugural 
Ceremony (Jan. 20, 2005) (“[I]t is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of 
democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of 
ending tyranny in our world.”). 
315. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DOCUMENT BY COUNTRY, http://hrw.org/ 
countries.html (select the DR Congo’s neighbors) (chronicling human rights violations and 
country conditions).  All of DR Congo’s neighbors—Uganda, Zambia, Angola, Republic of the 
Congo, Central African Republic, Sudan, Rwanda, and Burundi—consistently violate human 
rights or are not considered democratic.  Id. 
316. 22 U.S.C.A. § 2778 (West 2008). 
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C. SUPPORT, SIGN, AND RATIFY AN ARMS TRADE TREATY 
Small arms are increasingly the weapons of choice in modern day 
warfare.317  Small arms and light weapons (SA/LW) have played significant 
roles in conflicts in Angola, Burundi, DR Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Liberia, 
Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Sudan.318  The availability 
and use of SA/LW adds to the causes of conflict and generates a vicious 
circle in which greater insecurity further increases the demand for, and use 
of, these weapons.319 
The international community does not have a treaty regime to regulate 
the traffic in SA/LW (e.g., an arms trade treaty).320  To address the myopia, 
in 2001, the United Nations convened a conference on Illicit Trade in Small 
Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects.321  The conference convened 
in New York on July 9, 2001.322  Participants at the conference agreed on a 
Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in 
Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects.323  Attendees pledged to 
improve or implement measures in their countries, to communicate with 
other countries on the issue, to designate a national agency to address illicit 
arms trafficking, and to criminalize trafficking in illicit arms.324 
The U.S. representative at the conference, John Bolton, indicated a 
willingness only to discuss regulation of military arms.325  He was 
 
317. Elise Keppler, Preventing Human Rights Abuses by Regulating Arms Brokering: The 
U.S. Brokering Amendment to the Arms Export Control Act, 19 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 381, 385 
(2001). Conflicts are increasingly intrastate, waged by non-state actors such as armed militias, 
insurgents, and criminal gangs.  Id. 
318. See Michael Fleshman, Small Arms in Africa: Counting the Cost of Gun Violence, 15 
AFRICA RECOVERY 1, 1 (2001), available at http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/ 
vol15no4/154arms.htm (stating that small arms are killing Africans in increasing numbers). 
319. Owen Greene, et al., Light Weapons and Peacebuilding in Central and East Africa, in 
INT’L ALERT REPORT 31 (1998). 
320. See Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of a Convention Against 
Transnational Organized Crime on Work of Its Twelfth Session, G.A. Res. 383, ¶ 33, UN GAOR, 
55th Sess., UN Doc. A/55/383/Add.2 (2001), http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/final_instruments/ 
383ale.pdf (summarizing the progress of the international community towards an international 
agreement on SA/LW).  There are fifty-five state parties to the Protocol.  Id. The United States has 
not signed this Protocol, nor has it ratified the underlying treaty on the Transnational Crime 
Convention.  Id. 
321. See UN GAOR, 54th Sess., 80th Plen. Mtg. at 40-43, UN Doc. A/RES/54/54 (Dec. 15, 
1999) (deciding to convene the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and 
Light Weapons in All Its Aspects). 
322. Report of the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light 
Weapons in All Its Aspects, New York, July 9-20, 2001, ¶ 1, UN Doc. A/CONF.192/15. 
323. Id. at 7. 
324. Id. at 10. 
325. John R. Bolton, U.S. Statement at Plenary Session Under Secretary of State for Arms 
Control and International Security Affairs, UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and 
Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (July 9, 2001), available at http://www.un.int/usa/01_104.htm. 
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unwilling to discuss SA/LW.326  Bolton cited U.S. controls via the AECA 
and ITAR as the benchmark in regulating SA/LW.327  He stated that the 
AECA and ITAR are sufficient to address the problem for the United 
States.328  Bolton further elaborated that the United States does not support 
any course of action that constrains the legal trade and manufacture of small 
arms.329 
In the seven years following the initial conference, several events of 
international significance occurred.  The United States was attacked by a 
transnational terrorist group on its own soil;330 the United States invaded 
Afghanistan;331 and the United States invaded Iraq.332  In each of these 
situations, U.S. forces faced (and continue to face) guerilla combatants/ 
insurgents using SA/LW on an unprecedented scale.333  Perhaps in recog-
nition of the significant role SA/LW play in conflicts, the State Department 
has equivocated in its position on an arms trade treaty. 
Evidence of the undulation in U.S. policy regarding an arms trade 
treaty may be seen in speeches given by State Department officials.  In an 
April 12, 2005 speech to the Organization of American States SA/LW 
meeting, Ambassador Robert Loftis remarked that the United States 
supports all aspects of the 2001 UN Program of Action on Illicit Trade of 
Small Arms and Light Weapons.334  Ambassador Loftis said that the July 
2006 biennial meeting of states on SA/LW should focus on finalizing an 
international instrument that will facilitate the monitoring of arms traffick-
ing.335  He further remarked that the United States sees an arms trade treaty 
 
326. Id. 
327. Id. 
328. Id. 
329. Harold Hongju Koh, A World Drowning in Guns, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 2333, 2347-48. 
Professor Koh termed Bolton’s caveats to a Small Arms Treaty as “Bolton’s Do Nots.”  Id.  The 
“Do Nots” include:  
We do not support measures that would constrain legal trade. . . .  [We] do not support 
the promotion of international advocacy. . . .  We do not support measures limiting 
trade in SA/LW solely to governments. . . .  The United States will not support a 
mandatory Review Conference. . . .  The United States will not join consensus on a 
final document that contains measures abrogating the Constitutional right to bear 
arms. 
Id. 
330. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 293, at 48. 
331. Id. 
332. Id. 
333. John Diamond, Insurgents Give U.S. Valuable Training Tool, USA TODAY, Jan. 25, 
2006, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2006-01-25-insurgent-videos_x.htm. 
334. Ambassador Robert G. Loftis, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Political-
Military Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, Remarks to the Organization of American States Small 
Arms/Light Weapons Meeting (Apr. 12, 2005), http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rm/44625.htm. 
335. Id. 
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as facilitating the timely, reliable identification and tracing of illicit small 
arms and light weapons.336 
Despite such untoward indications regarding an arms trade treaty, on 
October 27, 2006, the United States was the lone country out of 164 to vote 
against a proposal to draft an arms trade treaty in the Disarmament and 
International Security Committee.337  From a statement given by Richard 
Grenell, a spokesperson for the U.S. mission to the United Nations, it 
appears that U.S. policy has returned to that promulgated by Ambassador 
Bolton in 2001.  Mr. Grenell cited higher U.S. standards than what an arms 
trade treaty would likely contain as the central reason for U.S. opposi-
tion.338  Mr. Grenell stated that all countries should have to agree on an 
international standard regarding an arms treaty before drafting may com-
mence.339  Mr. Grenell did not mention the reasons why the United States is 
forgoing the opportunity to assist in setting the standard for an international 
regime. Further, Mr. Grenell did not clarify why a lower standard would 
prevent the United States from becoming a state party to the treaty.  
Logically, by ratifying a treaty with lower standards then our current 
regime, the United States would not have to go through the onerous process 
of executing the treaty,340 and a possibly contentious ratification process.341 
Notwithstanding U.S. resistance to an arms trade treaty, other countries 
have continued to pursue the matter.  The UN General Assembly passed a 
resolution regarding a comprehensive arms trade treaty in December 
2006.342  The United States abstained from the vote.343  More recently, in a 
call for country views on an arms trade treaty, ninety-four countries 
 
336. Id. A SA/LW treaty is a tool for tracing illicit SA/LW, and presents a problem for 
earlier U.S. policy objections to registration requirements.  Tracing of illicit weapons will only be 
accomplished through a registration requirement.  INTERPOL Anniversary Highlights Coopera-
tion With UN to Fight Terrorism, INTERPOL, Nov. 4, 2005, http://www.interpol.int/Public/News/ 
2005/UNanni20051104.asp. 
337. Irwin Arieff, UN Panel Backs New Treaty on Global Arms Trade, REUTERS, Oct. 26, 
2006, http://today.reuters.com/News/CrisesArticle.aspx?storyId=N26250543&WTmodLoc= 
IntNewsHome_C4_Crises-6. 
338. UN Arms Control Resolution Approved, MWC NEWS, Oct. 27, 2006, http:// 
mwcnews.net/content/view/10459/51/. 
339. Id. 
340. Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140, 163 n.34 (2d Cir. 2003). 
341. U.S. CONST. art. II § 2. 
342. See UN GAOR, 61st Sess., UN Doc. A/C.1/61/L.55 (Oct. 12, 2006) (deciding to include 
an agenda “[t]owards an arm trade treaty: establishing common international standards for the 
import, export and transfer of conventional arms”). 
343. UN Assembly Adopts ATT Resolution, IANSA, Dec. 2006, http://www.iansa.org/ 
un/2006/GAvote.htm. 
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submitted their views before the June 20, 2007 deadline.344  The United 
States did not submit its view. 
The U.S. experience in implementing a comprehensive set of arms 
regulations, which include monitoring conditions in end-user countries and 
activities of domestic arms dealers, may provide valuable insight in drafting 
an arms trade treaty.  Additionally, assisting in drafting an arms trade treaty 
would further the current U.S. policy objective of transformational 
diplomacy.345 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This article focused on the inconsistencies and counter-productiveness 
of the current U.S. arms export regime.  This article demonstrated the 
danger of continuing to provide military assistance and allowing arms sales 
to unstable, undemocratic countries that violate human rights.  The danger 
centers on the likelihood that the military assistance and arms will be used 
to commit human rights violations.  Depending on the scale of the 
violations, the United States and other western countries pay the onerous 
clean-up bill.  Furthermore, military assistance and arms sales to developing 
countries with a large number of anti-American extremists may increase the 
threat to U.S. national security interests. 
To prevent the mistakes of the past from recurring, lessons must be 
learned.  The Congo Conflict serves as a reminder that the provision of 
military aid and arms to unstable leaders, even those aligned with U.S. 
interests, may lead to gross human rights abuses, failed states, and an 
expensive clean-up bill.  Negative effects from U.S. arms transfers may be 
avoided through procedural and substantive changes to the FAA and 
AECA.  Further, amending the FAA and the AECA, coordinating regula-
tory efforts from one bureau within the State Department, BAMAT, and 
joining the international community in an arms trade treaty will allow the 
United States to meet its stated foreign policy objectives. 
 
 
344. More Success for the Arms Trade Treaty Campaign, IANSA, June 29, 2007, 
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345. Secretary Condoleezza Rice, U.S. Dep’t of State, Testimony Before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee: Realizing the Goals of Transformational Diplomacy (Feb. 15, 2006), 
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